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A Serra Leoa é apenas um do número crescente de países que passou pela experiência da
aplicação de um instrumento de resolução de conflito que goza actualmente, à escala mundial,
de grande popularidade, a saber, eleições multi-partidárias. Enquanto método, destinado a
levar a bom termo um processo de procura da paz, este instrumento tem vindo a dar resultados
bastante diversos em África. Houve alguns êxitos, mas a instalação de governos pouco
recomendáveis e demasiado poderosos e/ou uma volta à guerra têm sido mais frequentes. Este
artigo examina em primeiro lugar as consequências das eleições realizadas na Serra Leoa em
2002, situando-as a seguir num leque de resultados obtidos em experiências semelhantes em
África. Finalmente examina e enuncia possibilidades de evitar ou minimizar os efeitos
negativos de eleições organizadas depois do fim de conflitos violentos, especialmente quando
decorrem da falta de segurança.
Sierra Leone is just one of a growing number of countries that has experienced the current
globally popular tool of conflict resolution, the multi-party election. This method of endeav-
ouring to put a final cap on a peace process has a mixed record in Africa. There have been some
successes, but the installation of unsuitable over-powerful governments and/or the return to
war have more often been the case. The article examines firstly the outcomes of the 2002 Sierra
Leone elections, and then situates these consequences on a spectrum of African post-conflict
elections outcomes. Finally, possibilities for avoiding or mitigating the negative effects of post-
conflict polls, particularly those emanating from the inevitable lack of security, are examined
and posited.
Sierra Leone est à peine un des pays  - dont le nombre ne cesse d'augementer - qui ont
passé par l'expérience de l’application d'un instrument de résolution de conflits que jouit
actuellement à l'échelle mondiale d'une grande popularité, à savoir les élections multi-partis.
Entant que méthode destinée à conduir à bon terme un processus de recherche de la paix, cet
instrument à donné des résultats assez divers en Afrique. Il y a eu quelques succès, mais l'ins-
tallation de gouvernements peu recommendables et trop puissnants et/ou le retour à la guer-
re ont été plus fréquents. Cet article examine en premier lieu les conséquences des élections
tenues en Sierra Leone en 2002, qu'il situe ensuite dans l'ensemble des résultats obtenus en
Afrique par des expériences semblables. Finalement il examine et énonce des possibilités d'évi-
ter ou d'ammoindrir les effets négatifs d'élections organisées après la fin de conflits violents,
especialement quant ces effects sont attribuables au manque de sécurité.
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Introduction
This paper follows a two-month field research period in Sierra Leone prior to,
during, and in the immediate aftermath of the recent elections1. Considering the only
recent apparent conclusion of a brutal ten-year civil war, the almost entirely peaceful
campaign and electoral process were very welcome. Contained below are some
thoughts about these elections and other African post-conflict polls.
It is contended here that each African post-conflict election, from Angola through
Mozambique and Sierra Leone, to Liberia and Sierra Leone again, has informed in
different but crucial ways the outcome of those that have followed. The article looks
at the 2002 Sierra Leonean elections and the lessons that may be passed on to the con-
tenders and electorate in the next post-conflict poll which will undoubtedly occur
somewhere on the continent in the near future. The fall-out from the transmission of
ideas includes the «peace vote». Voting for the person or party who, at the time,
seems most likely to preserve or enforce the peace would seem eminently rational
and has had some positive effects. However, the impact of this form of single-issue
voting can lead to landslides, the subsequent marginalisation of parliamentary and
former military opposition, and the creation of de facto one party states just at the
point when reconciliation is what is urgently required. Finally, the question is posed
as to whether international organisations should attempt to mitigate the considera-
ble effects of insecurity on elections.
Sierra Leone 2002 
The presidential candidate for the Movement for Progress, Zainab Bangura, com-
mented in the immediate aftermath of the 2002 Sierra Leonean elections that people
are «prepared to pay any price for peace»2. She was referring to the landslide victory
of the incumbent Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and its presidential candidate,
Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. In a country known for its ethno-regional voting in
multi-party elections stretching from independence in the early sixties to the last
polls in 1996, Kabbah and his south and eastern-based party made significant inro-
ads into the opposition northern strongholds. Bangura’s suggestion was that after 10
years of brutal civil war, Kabbah was perceived as the bringer and potential preser-
ver of peace and thus swept the board. There is no underestimating the effects of the
war on the infrastructure, economy and, above all, the people of Sierra Leone. There
1 Post-conflict elections are defined here as those elections that occur after a peace agreement or during a pause or peri-
od of reduced hostilities in an internal conflict that has affected a large proportion of the country, but particularly
where no side has militarily defeated the others.
2 Radio interview with MOP presidential candidate, Zainab Bangura, 20 May 2002.
39_50_Harris.qxd  5/6/03  10:08  Page 41
will be very few Sierra Leoneans who have not been directly affected or have no fam-
ily members who were directly affected by the war. Rightly or wrongly, hopes were
pinned on the elections. Many conversations concerning plans were prefaced with
the phrase, «after the elections». During the campaign, there was talk of education
policies and there were also huge rallies and ubiquitous slogans such as the SLPP’s
«Wu-teh-teh» (abundance or a big majority). The opposition party that came second,
the All People’s Congress (APC), could refer to the SLPP’s poor record on corrupti-
on and present itself as a new party distinct from the APC regime, which plundered
the country from 1968 to 1992 and contributed significantly to the conditions that cre-
ated and prolonged the war. However, Kabbah and his party grew increasingly con-
fident with the slogan, «We promised and we delivered», referring primarily to the
end of the war, even if it took five years of their rule to arrive.
There were some who insisted that Kabbah had not gained 70.1% of the presiden-
tial vote or the SLPP 67.8% of the parliamentary vote (translating to 74.1% of seats),
due to the large number of irregularities, particularly in the registration, and the alle-
ged incidents of harassment of opposition. There is no doubt that the SLPP benefited
from the perks of incumbency, certain electoral rules, an apparent policy of low-key
harassment and a confused registration process which suffered from omissions, mul-
tiple and underage registrations, and a non-functioning voter transfer system. For the
second election in a row, the number of ballots cast exceeded the number of registe-
red voters in several SLPP strongholds, each time on account of the shifting popula-
tion according to the successive electoral commissions. However, it seems unlikely
that the totality of these anomalies, whether the result of administrational inadequa-
cies or central planning, would have been enough to reduce Kabbah’s total down to
the magic 55%, which would have necessitated a second round run-off. Nine seats
less than the SLPP’s 83 of the 112 seats available, though, would have lost the party
its two-thirds majority in parliament.
Kabbah and the SLPP’s landslide victory benefited from its traditional support
base in the south and east, magnified by anomalies in the electoral process. The rea-
sons, however, for the inroads into the north and into the capital3 lie elsewhere. Being
a Mandingo and a northerner by birth, Kabbah could partially offset the domination
of his party by the Mende of the south and east. Some voters may equally have felt
that there was no one else to vote for considering the records of other parties and
individuals. However, more importantly, many view Kabbah, rightly or wrongly, as
the bringer of peace, the British army, ECOMOG (Economic Community of West
African States Monitoring Group), and the UN, in that order. His perceived crucial
connections to the «international community», particularly in Britain and within the
UN, were seen to have ensured the huge foreign intervention and would more like-
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3 For instance, in 1996, Kabbah polled 4.3% in the extreme northern district of Koinadugu and 25% in the Freetown
area. In 2002, he took 67% and 55% in the same districts.
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ly than anything else prevent a return to violence in any emergency that may arise in
the future. Critics say that little was done internationally to present any different pic-
ture. It is certainly remarkable that his reputation as an indecisive feeble president
was transformed into saviour of the nation in just one year. Kabbah’s perceived abi-
lity to attract international money, again through his connections, may also have con-
tributed to his electoral success. Commonwealth observers reported a frank announ-
cement from an SLPP loudspeaker van in Makeni which declared that if «Kabbah
go» then «UN go, white man go, money go»4.
The result of all this is a marginalised political opposition and almost a de facto
one-party state. The APC has just 24% of seats in parliament and the Revolutionary
United Front Party (RUFP), created from the brutal but largely disarmed RUF rebel
group, has none at all5. 
However, while the SLPP has limited parliamentary competition and has not felt
the need to include the opposition in government, it has many potential enemies
elsewhere. Given the continuing possibility that conflict may spill over again from
neighbouring Liberia or even Guinea, the many ex-combatants who are engaged in
the fighting elsewhere in the region, and the allegiances of the only partially demo-
bilised and still organised Kamajor militias, peace is clearly fragile. There is still a
dangerous pool of unrepresented, unemployed and disaffected youth, similar to that
which provided sustenance to the RUF, but with the added experience of conflict and
in some cases wartime local power. 
The efficacy and the loyalty of the new Sierra Leone armed forces, which voted
overwhelmingly for former military junta leader Johnny Paul Koroma6, are being tes-
ted at the same time as many UN troops are packing their bags7. Further, the new
SLPP administration may be making the right noises in addressing the rampant cor-
ruption that contributed to the conditions for the war, but there is as yet little accom-
panying action. 
The party might note that marginalised players have in the past used non-demo-
cratic means to pursue their objectives. Successful military coups in 1967, 1968, 1992,
1996 & 1997, which often produced governments packed with civilians who had mis-
sed out in previous elections or administrations, and the longevity and occasional
successes of the RUF and other African rebel forces show two alternative routes to
power.
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4 Commonwealth Observer Group, Sierra Leone Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Report, 17 May 2002, p. 18.
5 There are 112 seats allocated in the general election and 12 reserved for the election of Paramount Chiefs.
6 The results of the early Special Vote for those engaged in electoral duties, mainly soldiers and police, were leaked,
showing a considerable majority for Johnny Paul Koroma. Koroma’s party won its two seats in the west of Freetown,
a district home to large army barracks. Koroma is at the time of writing either on the run or dead and indicted by
the Special Court.
7 For a detailed post-election security analysis, see International Crisis Group, Sierra Leone After Elections: Politics as
Usual?, Freetown/Brussels, 12 July 2002.
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The Continental Transmission of Ideas 
and the Impact of «Peace-Voting»
A large part of the currently favoured post-Cold War solution to internal conflict
and a feature that is intended to put a cap on conflict resolution processes is the multi-
party election, organised in order to determine who will occupy the central seat of
power in a resurrected state. At this point, sub-Saharan Africa has probably experi-
enced as many of these elections as the rest of the world put together. Many African
voters who have suffered through long years of civil war are acutely aware of the
results of other post-conflict elections elsewhere on the continent. In particular, the
tragedy of the 1992 Angolan elections, where conflict resumed at a greater intensity
after the polls, cast a shadow over all subsequent elections of this kind. It is certainly
questionable whether the Angolan elections could ever have brought peace.
Margaret Anstee, the former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to
Angola, is convinced that peace could have been brought to Angola had there been
an international resolve to do so8, but other UN officials and many commentators
believe that the mistrust, bellicosity, unwillingness to compromise and will to power
of elements on both sides would have rendered ineffective an electoral result that
went either way. However, the failure of the Angolan elections has provided a prece-
dent of what may happen if a powerful combatant, in this case the losing candidate,
Jonas Savimbi, emerges (or is poised to emerge) with nothing from the process.
At this point, the post-Cold War peace vote in Africa was born. This is not to say
that it derives entirely from the Angolan experience, only that the precedent was set
and is known by many across Africa. The peace vote is a factor that fundamentally
affects all post-conflict elections wherever there is a conceivable peace option to vote
for9. Its form and its effects, though, are not always the same.
Arguably, in Mozambique in 1994, the knowledge and immediacy of the Angolan
polls had a positive effect on the elections and any subsequent chances of peace and
reconciliation. There is evidence that voters cast their ballots tactically, and were
encouraged to do so by local organisations and church groups10. A vote for, say, the
incumbent, Joaquim Chissano, for president and the rebel party, Renamo, for legisla-
ture would increase the likelihood of giving a slice of the national cake to both sides,
thereby decreasing the probability of a return to conflict. In the end, Chissano's 53%
against Dhlakama's 34% in the presidential race was a considerable winning margin.
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8 M. ANSTEE (1996), Orphans of the Cold War: the Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-3, MacMillan
Press, Basingstoke, p. 542.
9 Sierra Leone in 1996, which is briefly outlined below, and Guinea-Bissau in 1999-2000 are possible examples with no
peace vote option.
10 A. VINES (1996), Renamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?, Centre for Southern Africa Studies, York;  M.
EBATA (1999), The Transition from War to Peace: Politics, Political Space and the Peace Industry in Mozambique 1992-5, LSE,
PhD thesis, London.
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However, in the elections for the National Assembly, Frelimo's 52% translated to 129
seats in comparison to Renamo's 45%, equating to 112 seats. Many have observed
that Renamo and its leader, Afonso Dlakhama, had little choice to accept the result,
given their lack of marketable resources and their dwindling international support.
However, the favourable results gave them at least a route into power politics and a
good chance of real power in the future. Since then, Renamo have failed to capture
the ultimate prize, but the country remains largely peaceful, and Dlakhama’s party
is still the only meaningful opposition, conceivably poised to electorally capitalise on
Frelimo’s mistakes.
Adifferent story unfolded in 1997 in Liberia, where the Liberian electorate and the
candidates could look back at the two contrasting examples in Lusophone Africa, but
more importantly just over the border in Sierra Leone. In the Sierra Leonean electi-
ons of 1996 there was no peace option to vote for. The RUF was not standing and ins-
tead threatened the security of the polls from outside the process. The incumbent
military regime had proved incapable of concluding the war and any victorious civi-
lian party was equally likely to be more or less successful. Liberians only had to look
across the border into Sierra Leone to see the travails of the subsequent Kabbah gov-
ernment, out of power after a military coup just two months before the Liberian polls
in July. The Liberian electorate voted not for civilians, but for the military man who
probably (but wrongly) seemed more likely to prevent the sort of turbulence taking
place in Freetown. Ironically, Kabbah is now considered to be the Sierra Leonean pro-
tector of the peace. Charles Taylor, leader of the rebel group that had controlled swa-
thes of the country for seven years and a character not dissimilar in style or ambiti-
on from Savimbi, was probably seen as the only president likely to enforce peace11.
Taylor and his party won with an overwhelming 75% of the vote and were able, over
the following years, to thoroughly marginalise the political opposition. The country,
though, returned to civil war and Taylor’s regime had to contend with two increa-
singly confident and successful new rebel groups, the Liberians United for
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia
(MODEL). Taylor finally fled the country to exile in Nigeria under intense internal
and external pressure in August 2003, and his party entered into a coalition govern-
ment with LURD and MODEL.
If the peace vote in the 2002 Sierra Leonean elections did not quite play the defi-
ning role that it did in Liberia, it was clearly a crucial factor in the final result. There
were other forces at play, the traditional patterns of voting were not forgotten, but the
peace vote considerably enhanced the result. Although the comparisons between the
Kabbah and Taylor administrations are limited, the extra-parliamentary opposition
to both governments is evident. It is, then, the landslide result in Sierra Leone, which
45DAVID HARRIS
11 D. HARRIS (1999), «From “Warlord” to “Democratic” President: How Charles Taylor won the 1997 Liberian
Elections», Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 37 N.º 3, pp. 431-455.
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must be the major concerning factor. Further, Sierra Leone is the exception in post-
Cold War Africa in that the rebel party won nothing at the polls. Post-conflict electi-
ons are fundamentally different from peacetime elections. Voter’s minds are concen-
trated on the outcome that is seen as most likely to maintain peace, be it a Charles
Taylor or a Tejan Kabbah presidency. In each of these cases, landslides resulted from
the impact of the peace vote. 
The Peace Vote and Liberal Democracy
It could be noted that in a liberal democracy the electorate is at liberty to vote whi-
chever way and for whatever reasons. The will of the people must prevail. By this
token, there is nothing more to be said about any form of single issue voting. Equally,
then, there is nothing to say beyond mere observations and certainly nothing to pro-
pose concerning, for example, the ethno-regional patterns of voting that significantly
outweigh any crosscutting influences in a majority of African elections. And yet
many observers do. Many inside and outside Africa decry this electoral state of
affairs, blame these «primordial» or «instrumental» affiliations for crises of demo-
cracy and conflict, and propose all manner of social and constitutional engineering in
order to bring about issues-based electoral politics.
There is a distinction to be drawn between people’s voting preferences and the
electoral rules and regulations that promote the possibility of choosing more freely
and being represented more equitably. On the one hand, ethno-regional voting is
popular. Notwithstanding the acknowledged fluidity and sometimes recent inventi-
on of identities, any assumptions that Africa’s ethnic identities will decline in signifi-
cance over the coming years are most probably mistaken. Ethnicity is a positive soci-
etal factor that holds communities together as well as pulling nations apart. Besides,
trying to persuade Inkatha not to appeal to Zulu nationalism or the SLPP to abandon
its Mende base would be largely pointless. The democratic project, as Mikael
Karlstrom informs us, «is everywhere emergent and incomplete» and the Western
version can only claim to be an «historical priority», not hold a «monopoly of its cur-
rent or future forms or definitions»12. Other forms of democracy that may develop
could conceivably be based on entirely different foundations. Claude Ake suggested
that «there is no alternative to recreating democracy in every historical instance»,
which «is what all the “established democracies” had to do»13. There is no doubt that,
in some cases, the abuses of an elected ethnocratic government have led to the poli-
tical and economic marginalisation of opposition parties and regions, and that in oth-
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12 M. KARLSTROM (1996), «Imagining Democracy: Political Culture and Democratisation in Buganda», Africa, vol. 66, N.º
4, pp. 485-505.
13 C. AKE (2000), The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa, CODESRIA, Dakar.
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ers, multi-party elections have exacerbated societal conflict. One could suggest,
however, that the causes of such democratic crises lie less in ethno-regional electoral
politics and more in the benefits or promise of centralised economic and political
power and unchecked patron-clientelism. 
On the other hand, constitutional engineering that seeks to decentralise and bro-
aden representation in places of power is not determining voter preferences, but
making some votes more effective. Equally, attempts to mitigate those factors that
remove choice and unfairly alter the electoral balance in favour of one party does not
denigrate voter freedom. These factors include, for example, abuse of the advantages
of incumbency in all types of elections, and, pertinent here, the need to vote for peace
in post-conflict elections. 
Mitigating the Electoral Effects of Insecurity
At this point, we might attempt to gaze into the future for potential post-conflict
elections and any new ideas that may be stored up. From one angle, the voting ploy
of the Liberian electorate has not worked. The country was soon and once more
wracked with civil war, made little economic progress, and had the unenviable sta-
tus of international pariah. From a different perspective, is there a danger in a future
scenario in a different country, that the rebel movement will look at the RUF/P and
conclude that they failed at the polls because they disarmed too well and didn’t secu-
re any of the peace vote? There is an argument with some validity that the RUFP had
made no serious attempts to build up the capacity of its leadership, had very limited
support due to its brutality, and then destroyed itself through infighting, defections
and greed, but it was also perceived by the «international community» and the elec-
torate to be spent as a military force and therefore in a condition reduced enough to
be ignored by election time.
The effects of insecurity, then, are evident. The question is what can be done to
mitigate the more negative aspects. The obvious first step may be to postpone all
post-conflict elections until security is watertight and there is no need to vote for
peace. Many NGOs and political parties called for the 2002 Sierra Leone elections to
be delayed, and similar groups made comparable demands in all the other cases14.
Most post-conflict elections are hurried affairs, with the notable exception of
Mozambique, where two years elapsed between peace agreement and polls.
However, most elections of this kind are undertaken in a window of opportunity, in
which outside bodies help to keep the window open through very costly peacekee-
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14 For a general academic discussion around this point, see  K. KUMAR &  M. OTTAWAY (1998), «General Conclusions and
Priorities for Policy Research», in K. KUMAR (ed.), Postconflict Elections, Democratization & International Assistance,
Lynne Rienner, Boulder.
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ping operations. The Mozambican process took place in the financially less troubled
heyday of UN peacekeeping, but still suffered from insecurity. It seems unlikely that
UN forces or troops of a regional counterpart such as ECOMOG would be able to
guarantee security, or that economic motives would in the current climate allow
these troops to stay a minute longer than is deemed absolutely necessary.
Some have put forward winner-takes-all elections and overbearing executive pre-
sidential arrangements as the major stumbling blocks to peace through the ballot
box15. Power-sharing and governments of national unity, before or after elections,
have been postulated as possible solutions16. Other constitutional engineering and
electoral arrangements that may favour reconciliation have also been suggested17.
There would most likely be benefits from many of these ideas if they could be imple-
mented. Some, indeed, have been implemented. South Africa, not so far considered
in this study18, may have benefited in 1994 from electoral arrangements, which gave
two opposition parties control over a province each, and the subsequent government
of national unity that allocated cabinet posts according to proportion of the vote won.
In Mozambique in 1994, a brand of proportional representation was negotiated that
benefited the two major warring parties and marginalised the others. The SLPP was
forced to form a coalition in order to govern in 1996. At the same time, no power sha-
ring has emerged from elections in Angola, Mozambique, Liberia or Sierra Leone
since the 2002 polls, and electoral arrangements have been almost entirely dictated
by circumstances in the latter two cases. Electoral and constitutional details are often
held hostage to timetabling requirements and power bargaining during peace nego-
tiations.
Are there other forms of international intervention that may directly alleviate the
effects of insecurity and produce a more level security playing field? One method
might derive from a reasonably successful experiment that the UN has already tried.
Between 1992 and 1994, Renamo benefited from a substantial UN Trust Fund desig-
ned to aid its transformation from a largely military force into a political party. It is
not clear to whom this funding found its way, but it probably aided Renamo’s credi-
bility as a political party. No such international support was given to the civilian or
rebel opposition in Liberia or Sierra Leone. It would, of course, have been difficult to
apportion funds to the collapsing and internally and externally vilified RUFP, some
of whose members were also hoarding cash and diamonds. Provision for resourcing
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15 For example, A. W. PEREIRA (1994), «The Neglected Tragedy: The Return to War in Angola, 1992-3», Journal of Modern
African Studies, pp. 1-18.
16 See I. W. ZARTMAN (1995), «Putting Things Back Together» & M. OTTAWAY (1995), «Democratisation in Collapsed
States», both in I. W. ZARTMAN (ed.), Collapsed States: the Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Lynne
Rienner, Boulder.
17 T. SISK & A. REYNOLDS [eds.] (1998), Elections and Conflict Management in Africa, US Institute of Peace Press,
Washington.
18 South Africa and Namibia have not been considered in this sub-Saharan study. The special nature of these elections,
where patterns of voting are fundamentally different to the rest of the continent, where the state and economy have
remained largely intact, and where the security forces have not surrendered control over any significant areas, ren-
ders these cases less appropriate for comparison.
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the RUF’s transformation to a political party was included in the 1999 Lomé agree-
ment, but instead RUFP members remained under UN sanctions, the threat of the
Special Court hung over them19, and international support was effectively weighted
towards the incumbent and against all of the opposition. 
Given the already enormous costs of peacekeeping and the moral difficulties in
funding former rebels with abysmal human rights records (although such difficulti-
es with Renamo were put aside), perhaps a reasonably low-cost strategy may be to
centrally fund and at the same time fiscally limit all parties, much as is the case in
some European countries. This may be considered a violation of national sovereignty,
but could also be presented as a counter to some of the effects of an already heavily
violated sovereignty in a very artificial situation. It would also mean putting to one
side the currently in-vogue, but often impractical, counter-productive and potentially
destabilising, practice of applying war crimes tribunals in immediate post-conflict
situations irrespective of political considerations on the ground. The proposal, howe-
ver, may well be beneficial to all concerned, giving a shot in the arm for the serious
parties who may otherwise not appear credible in the climate; and smoothing a route
for the transformation of rebel forces from military to political, while giving support
to those within the forces who are more inclined to a political path. This is perhaps
just one of many suggestions that could be brought forward to counter the need for
a peace vote. It is to be hoped that in the current climate where emphasis is placed on
wars against terrorism and international exit strategies required by budgetary cons-
traints, there is still time and space for assessment and long-term planning.
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19 At the time of writing, the thirteen indicted by the Special Court included five RUF members (of which the former
leader, Foday Sankoh, and the battlefield commander, Sam «Maskita» Bockarie, are dead); four 1997-8 junta mem-
bers (including on the run Johnny Paul Koroma); three civil militia leaders (including former SLPP Minister of the
Interior, Sam Hinga Norman); and former president of Liberia in exile, Charles Taylor.
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